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The economic performance of Uruguay in the last fifty years has been disappointing.
Per capita GDP in the period grew at modest rates -0.4% per year-well below the growth rate of more dynamic countries in Latin America (e.g., Brazil or Mexico with 2.2% on average for the same period) and East Asia (e.g. Korea or Thailand, with annual growth rates above 4%).
Not only the rate of growth has been slow but, relative to the world economy, it has also declined steadily. In Figure 1 we plotted per-capita GDP in Uruguay relative to that in the US, which we take as the benchmark for comparison.
1 Relative per capita GDP is computed adjusting for PPP prices. It can be seen the steady decline since 1955, with only a mild recovery in the 1990s before the recession that followed Argentina's collapse in 2000.
This below par performance occurred while significant reforms were undertaken, several macro arrangements put in place, two severe financial crisis took place, different wage bargaining arrangements were in place, the signature of the MERCOSUR Treaty and unilateral tariff reductions, are among the most significant changes that affected the rules of the economic game and incentives of different agents, particularly in the manufacturing sector.
Section 1 of this paper documents the relative performance of the Uruguayan Economy, computes the sources of growth and reports the importance of total factor productivity to understand the evolution of total output. Section 2 decomposes the productivity change in four main sources: i) a utilization effect, reflecting the intensity with which the existing endowments of factors are used in the production process, ii) a reallocation effect, reflection to what extent factors of production are reallocated to firms that differ in their marginal productivities, iii) a markup effect that reflect the increases of input utilization across sectors that differ in market power, and iv) a residual term that may be interpreted as the effect of technical change. Finally, section 3 performs a contrafactual exercise of the impact of several policies on output growth.
Long-Run Growth: Relative Performance and Sources of Growth
In this section we compute the sources of growth for Uruguay in the 1955-2003 period.
We decompose GDP growth into factor accumulation and changes in total factor productivity (TFP). Our measure of TFP is compared to that of the US economy, which we take as our benchmark for the technology frontier. As a reference point, the US economy is not a demanding competitor, since in this period productivity grew at lower rates than the world economy, East Asia, and Europe. Nevertheless, we use the US data to avoid the complications derived from computing capital stocks and TFP for groups of countries, for which no agreed-upon methodology on aggregation exists.
Measuring Total Factor Productivity
We measure total factor productivity (TFP) assuming that GDP is produced according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function 2 ( )
where L t is employment, K t represents the services of physical capital, and H t represents the services of human capital and are proxied by hL, where h is the average education level Parameter A t , is the indicator of the technical efficiency in the use of factors, typically dubbed productivity index or TFP. According to this definition, TFP encompasses not only technical efficiency but also the degree of use of the stock of physical capital.
To compute TFP we need to build capital series. We cumulate investment I t , according to the perpetual inventory method, a starting value for K 3 and an annual depreciation rate, δ, of 4%: 
where W corresponds to the market return of education adjusting by age, gender, and other factors P ik is the proportion of active workers in the labor force in each of the six categories of education considered in the analysis. Hence, the measure of H accounts for those workers that abandon the labor force (e.g., retirement or inactivity) as well as for the eventual productivity gains derived from informal education or experience. Figure 2 presents the evolution of the stock of human and physical capital, normalized to be 100 in 1955. It can be seen the slow but steady growth in human capital (average education levels) during the whole period; as of 2003, education levels in Uruguay rank among the highest in Latin America (ECLAC, 2004) . On the contrary, physical capital exhibits important swings as a result of the high volatility of fixed capital formation. the 1960 -2003 period (Solimano and Soto, 2004 ). This assumption is inconsequential for the qualitative results of the analysis. A sensitivity analysis is presented in the appendix. 4 A 4% depreciation rate is customary. Bucacos (1999) suggests using 8% for machinery and 2.5% for dwellings. Our assumption would imply that the capital stock in machinery is around 25% of the total stock, which is consistent with the results of Solimano and Soto (2004) .
To compute TFP, we need an estimate for the share of capital in GDP, α . National income accounts indicate that the share of labor compensation in GDP valued at factor prices (GDP at market prices minus indirect taxes) is small in Latin American countries relative to, say, that in the OECD countries. We choose a higher value of the labor share for growth accounting 0.7 -corresponding to α=0.3-for two reasons. First, measured labor compensation in developing countries fails to account for the income of most selfemployed and family workers, who make up a large fraction of the labor force. Gollin (2002) shows that, for countries where there is sufficient data to adjust for this measurement problem, the resulting labor shares tend to be close to the value in the United States, 0.70. Second, a high capital share implies implausibly high rates of return on capita 5 . With regard to the other parameter, β, we follow Klenow and RodriguezClare (1997) and assume a value of 0.28 6 The qualitative results are largely unaffected 5 With α =0.65 as suggested by national accounts and a capital/GDP ratio of 2.8 (the mean for all Latin American economies in the 1960-2002 period), in the steady state the real interest rate should be above 23% per year. 6 The used parameters for physical and human capital do not differ from those used by Pereira and Prieto (2003) and Bucacos (1999) . Appendix A shows the qualitative insensitivity of results to changes in these parameters.
by the choice of these parameters.
Given our choice of α and the computed capital series, we calculate our measure of TFP, as follows: Figure 3 plots the calculated TFP against GDP per working-age person. It is convenient to use per-working age person GDP (defined as the segment of the population between 15 and 65 years of age), to avoid biases arising from demographic changes. It can be seen that there is a close correlation between both series, suggesting that if one is to discuss economic growth in Uruguay then productivity changes ought to play an important role in the analysis. Equation (4) also shows that this need not be the case as changes in human and physical capital also affect this relationship.
In order to compute the contribution of factor accumulation and TFP to economic growth, we express equation (1) as:
Expression (5) is a convenient way to express the growth in average productivity of labor as the result of productivity gains (the growth rate of TFP), the accumulation of physical capital (as share of GDP) and the accumulation of human capital. In order to eliminate transient phenomena, we study the long-run changes of these variables, focusing on decades rather than year-to-year variations. This is a very low rate even when compared to the rest of the Latin American economies, where productivity levels grew at an average of 1.3% per year in the same period. Needless to say, these rates are well below that of East Asian countries (4.7%) and the OECD (2.4%). As mentioned, productivity in our benchmark economy, the US, grew at the same modest rate of 1.3% during most of this the period. Out of the 0.9% of annual growth in productivity in Uruguay, total factor productivity accounts for around 45%, which confirms the key role TFP plays in economic growth. Nevertheless, the share of TFP in growth in the successful economies of East Asia and Europe is usually much higher, around 60%). marked an important reversal in policies and saw the resumption of growth (see Rottenberg, 1993) . Physical and human capital expanded pari pasu with GDP, but economic growth was largely driven by total factor productivity which recovered at 
Industry level Evidence of TFP Growth
The previous section documented the significant role that TFP plays on economic growth at the aggregate level. While valuable as a description of the working of the economy, we are limited in our understanding of how producers react to macro and microeconomic shocks and policies. For example, how do producers switch resources from one industry to another as a result of changes in relative prices? How fast do producers adopt and adapt technology?
To answer these questions we assembled a panel of Uruguayan firms in the manufacturing sector for the 1982-2001 period. We rely on industry level observations (4 digit ISIC) provided by the manufacturing censuses (1988 and 1997) and annual surveys by the Institute Nacional de Estadistica (INE), which covers firms above 5 employees. 7 We define productivity changes as the difference in the rates of growth of value added and a suitably weighted average of capital and labor inputs. The change in total factor productivity can be decomposed into four sources. First, the utilization effect, reflecting the intensity with which the existing endowments of factors are used in the production process. Second, the reallocation effect, which reflects the ability of producers to relocate factors of production from low-productivity firms to firms where marginal productivity is higher. Third, tbe markup effect reflects the increase of input utilization across sectors that differ in market power. Fourth, a residual term that may be interpreted as the effect of technical change. 8 Figure 4 depicts the evolution of labor productivity in the sample. Discontinuities arise from the problems of the raw data described in the appendix. It can be seen the notable expansion in productivity in the 1988-1996 period, which is consistent with the TFP figures in section 1. Nevertheless, there are important differences, as the comparison of figures 3 and 4 suggest. First, the magnitude of productivity gains in the manufacturing sector are much higher than those of TFP: while the latter are in the neighborhood of 2%, the former are around 6%.
Second, TFP declines notoriously after 1999, while productivity in the manufacturing sector remains largely unaltered.
Following Fernald and Basu (1998) the decomposition of productivity defined as the difference of the growth rates of value added and a weighted average of labor and capital inputs (dp = dv − dx V ) is: dp = (
where dv is the aggregate growth in value added, V µ is the average markup across firms, dx V is the weighted-average growth of labor and capital inputs, du is the weighted average of utilization rates at the sector level, R represents reallocation of inputs between firms, and dt V is the weighted average of sector technical change. by gross output. The shares sum to less than one if firms make pure profits. Estimation of equation (7) is discussed in the appendix and the results of the productivity decomposition are presented in Table 2 . Table 3 . It can be seen that productivity levels in the 1979-1997 period grew around 5% per year, substantially less than in Uruguay, despite the fact that in this same period aggregate TFP in Chile expanded at 3.7% per year, that is 50%, more than the Uruguayan level (2.3%). The high increase in productivity is explained by the relatively high and sustained technical change of Uruguayan firms as well as the relocation of inputs between and within industries. Relocation of inputs reflects, naturally, the combined effects of changes in relative prices as well as the initial slack in each sector. In the Chilean case, input relocation derived largely from market liberalization and trade opening, a process that was largely completed by the mid 1980s.
In Uruguay, the process of relocation seems to lose momentum -or may be have been completed-in the late 1990s. 
Economic Reforms and Long-run Growth
The previous sections document the importance of TFP in economic growth and the substantial response of plants to economic stimulus, in terms of relocating resources and adopting technology. The link between TFP growth and economic reforms is, arguably, very lose in the above description. In order to formalize more the connection between them we use the econometric results of Loayza and Soto (2002) Finally, external shocks are also accounted for by including terms-of-trade shocks and period-specific shifts common to all countries in the sample. prediction cannot be the result of the economy recuperating from a previous recession.
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In addition, note that actual growth is much more volatile than predicted by the model, which points to policies and foreign shocks as the main source for growth instability (structural factors evolve usually slowly on time). According to this panel-data model, hence, the growth performance of Uruguay is somewhat puzzling. Nevertheless, a study of the contribution to growth of the different determinants suggests two important conclusions. First, that government policies are at the base of growth instability. Second, that reforms have been the source of higher-than-predicted growth in the 1970s and 1990s, pointing to the need of deepening such reforms.
In Table 5 we show the contribution of policies to growth changes in Uruguay by decade. In the first row we report the actual change in per capita GDP (e.g., the rate of growth in the 1970s was 2.2 percentage points higher than that of the 1960s). It can be seen the beneficial impact on GDP growth of the continuous expansion in infrastructure, education, and governance. They have a combined impact of around 0.7 percentage points and suggest the need of further expanding the coverage and quality of these public services. Table 5 Contribution of Structural and Stabilization Policies to Changes in Per capita GDP 1970s vs.1960s 1980s vs.1970s 1990s vs.1980s Actual Change in Per Capita 2.2% -3. Finally, the negative effect of instability on economic growth -and the beneficial impact of stabilization policies-is clearly depicted in the last rows of Table 5 . The four indicators suggest that Uruguay paid a high welfare cost in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of high inflation, real exchange rate overvaluation, and especially banking crises.
Growth
It is also noteworthy that out of the expansion of 3.3 percentage points in the 1990s when compared to the 1980s, more than 50% is directly related to stabilization policies.
The last exercise that we perform using the econometric model of Loayza and Soto (2002) Likewise, opening the economy seems to provide a sensible way to expand per capita GDP at faster rates. Again, Uruguay seems to be moving in the right direction, yet rather slowly. Trade volumes -net of idiosyncratic characteristics-are around 65% of GDP, while those of developed economies is more or less the double. East Asian economies, which have based the successful growth strategy on exports, traded around 220% of GDP in the 1990s. Chile has also turned in that direction and now trade is around 125% of GDP.
Finally, stabilization policies can also play a significant role. While the benefits of controlling inflation may be insignificant, those of reducing output variability seem to be quite important. Developed economies exhibit business cycles that are around 1/4 in size when compared to those in Uruguay (but it should be noted that the data excludes the 2002 crisis). However, it may be very difficult to achieve stability on this area as large fluctuations may be just a characteristic of development. In fact. East Asian economies and Chile exhibit similar levels to those of Uruguay in the 1990s. 
The Construction of the Manufacturing Firms Database
The construction of the database was a difficult task. We took care to link the different samples in order to represent a comparable subset of the population of manufacturing firms. Along the 1982-2001 period, the results refer to those establishments with more than five employees. Since 1997 the classification system changed form ISIC rev. 2 to ISIC rev 3. Hence we reclassified the observations prior to 1987 and estimated the contributions of the corresponding 4 digit ISIC 2 to the 3 digit sectors containing them in the cases where a one to one allocation was not feasible. The most daunting task was to take care for the swings in the estimation of total employment and in the industry variables that took place each time a major sample revision took place (1988 and 1997) .
Most of the problems arise from the survey referring to a fixed sample space given by all firms registered at the three Economic Censuses performed respectively in 1978,
1988 and 1997. Only since 1999 care was taken to yearly incorporate newborn firms from a social security register database. Hence the sample deteriorated as time passed since the updates of the sample framework at the Censuses, leading to serious estimation errors.
The survey is based on stratified sampling. Probability of extraction is one for establishments with more than 100 employees. The total estimates in these strata are the sum of the sample observations. In the smaller size ranges, probability of extraction is proportional to size, i.e. the share of the establishment in the census employment of the stratum, and estimated values are obtained by multiplying sampled observation values by the inverse of the probability of extraction and then averaged to obtain the estimated totals for each size stratum. The sample size in the smaller range is taken to be enough to cover a fixed fraction of the census employment of the strata.
The crude data were almost unusable in their primary state, and each of the sector time series presented dramatic discrete jumps of a very sizeable magnitude. For instance, the total 1988 census figures show that that year's Survey figures for employment misrepresented the total in almost 50,000 jobs (about 30% of total manufacturing employment). So we undertook a process of smoothing each individual time series, linking the data provided by each particular source: Annual manufacturing survey from 1982 to 1987 and 1989 to 1996 , 1988 and 1997 Censuses, and Annual Economic Activity survey from 1998 to 2001. We based our method in prior work by Cassoni (1999) that proposed a smoothing method based on geometrically distributing the difference in the growth of the survey series and the average growth revealed by the Census observations, along all the years between the change of sample points.
The rationale for doing so is based on the fact that the fixed sample criterion of the INE causes the data to misrepresent the sampled population. We have the 1988 and 1997
observations for each industry both by the corresponding census and the Survey and that was the starting point to the comparison. We also had to provide the capital stock figures, based on the two census measurements, and then carrying back and forward the estimation by adding the estimated investment and trying several alternative assumptions about depreciation. Investment figures, though recorded by the INE, were not provided and had to be estimated using microdata for the 1982-1988 years, using a weighted establishment estimator for the industry totals constructed following the INE methodology used for the rest of the published series. We deflated inputs using the 4 digit special indexes provided by Piccardo and Ferre (2002) , and the Manufacturing wholesale index for each industry's output.
Estimating the industry productivity decomposition
Estimation of equation (7) would require an index of capital utilization. Abbott et al (1998) and Fernald and Basu (1999) suggest to use as a proxy the growth rate in hours worked. Hence, we estimate:
where dh is the growth rate in employment or hours worked. The estimated regressions are reported in Table A1 . This equation allows us to compute an appropriate measure of technical changer, as a residual. Shares of the different inputs were obtained as the average use of inputs in the whole period of analysis. To compute the share of capital in each sector it was necessary to compute a series of the required payments for unit of capital and estimate the user cost for each unit of capital.
After estimating equation (9) we calculated the sum of the group-specific constant and the residual of each equation as the measure of technical change in the gross-output production function. These results were inserted in the following aggregation equation to decompose aggregate productivity into a technological component plus various nontechnological components, including the effects of markups and reallocation of inputs:
where dv is the aggregate growth in value added, V µ is the average markup across firms, V dx is the weighted-average growth of inputs, du is a weighted-average of utilization rates at the sector level, R represents reallocation of inputs among firms, and V dt is the weighted average of sector technical changes.
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Expressing productivity growth as V dx dv dp − = , equation (10) becomes
11 The aggregate output measure is presented in value added terms rather than in gross terms and is obtained as a difference between gross output and materials. For details on the computation of aggregate variables see Fernald and Basu (1999) .
Equation (11) shows that aggregate growth in total measured factor productivity is a combination of the growth of inputs in sectors with different markups, the change in labor effort and capital utilization, the effect of input reallocation, and technical change, respectively. Transitional convergence: An important implications of most growth models is that the growth rate depends on the initial position of the economy. The "conditional convergence" hypothesis maintains that, ceteris paribus, poor countries should grow faster than rich ones because of decreasing returns to scale in production. To control for the initial position of the economy, it is customary to include the initial level of real per capita GDP in the set of explanatory variables. Trade leads to higher specialization and, thus to gains in total factor productivity (TFP); it expands potential markets and allows domestic firms to take advantage of economies of scale; it diffuses technological innovations and improved managerial practices; it tends to lessen anticompetitive practices of domestic firms; and it inhibits rent-seeking activities that are mostly unproductive. The fourth area is related to the government burden measured by the ratio of government consumption to GDP. The fifth area of policy involves the availability of public services and infrastructure, which is proxied by the number of main telephone lines per capita. Finally, the last area is governance, which comprises several aspects of the institutional quality of government, including the respect for civil and political rights, bureaucratic efficiency, absence of corruption, enforcement of contractual agreements, and prevalence of law and order. The proxy for governance is the first principal component of four indicators reported by Political Risk Services in their publication International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG).
Stabilization policies: With regards to stabilization policies, Soto and Loayza (2002) control first for fiscal and monetary policies, including lack of price stability (proxied by the average inflation rate); the cyclical volatility of GDP, which reflects the lack of output stability and is measured by the standard deviation of the output gap for the corresponding country and period. In addition, they include external imbalances and the risk of balance-of-payments crises. This factor is measured by an index of real exchange rate overvaluation, which is constructed following the methodology in Dollar (1992).
Real exchange rate overvaluation captures the impact of monetary and exchange rate policies that distort the allocation of resources between the exporting and domestic 
